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vened three-judge court is not void for want of jurisdistion,7 2 as is the decree of
a single judge when three are required. However, the Supreme Court will dismiss an appeal from such a court as soon as the defect is discovered. This
necessitates the delay and expense of a second appeal, 73 this time to the court of
appeals. But even that may not be possible. By the time the Supreme Court has
dismissed the first appeal, the time for appealing to the court of appeals will
probably have expired.74 This can be remedied only by securing an order from
the Supreme Court directing the district court to enter a new decree from which
a timely appeal can be taken. While in most cases the Supreme Court has been
willing to issue such an order, in some cases it has refused to do so, leaving the
appellant remediless. 75The only safe course would seem to be to file two appeals,
one to the Supreme Court and one to the court of appeals, whenever there is
doubt as to whether or not a three-judge court has been properly convened.
It is submitted that retention of the three-judge procedure is unjustified.
The needs for which it was designed are largely a thing of the past, and its remaining functions have been taken over by other procedures. Far from
furnishing speedy justice in cases of "vast public moment," the three-judge
procedure has proven in operation to be a heavy burden on the courts and a
source of procedural pitfalls for litigants. The Three-judge Acts survive as little
more than an expression by Congress of a lack of confidence in the judiciary.
72 Healy

v. Ratta, s=pra note 71.
delay can be considerable. In Healy v. Ratta, supra note 71, for example, two years
were lost between the original three-judge decree granting an injunction and the final decision
in the Supreme Court, which reversed the same decree and dissolved the injunction. In the
meantime, after theSupreme Courthad dismissed a direct appeal on the ground that the threejudge court had been unnecessarily convened, the court of appeals had taken the appeal on the
merits, 67 F.2d 554 (lst Cir. 1933), and the case had reached the Supreme Court by certiorari.
7
4An appeal to the court of appeals must be taken within thirty days from the entry of
judgment in the district court. FED. R. Cxv. P. 73 (a).
7r E.g., Smith v. Wilson, 273 U.S. 388 (1927); Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 272 U.S.
317 (1926). In the Smith case the plaintiff then applied to the Supreme Court for mandamus to
compel the circuit court of appeals to accept his appeal even though it was too late. The
Supreme Court denied the writ. Ex park Smith, 274 U.S. 723 (1927). The case is discussed in
Sloss, supranote 69, at 99.
73 The

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AND INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
When a defendant in a state criminal prosecution challenges the admission
of his confession, alleging it was coerced,' states following the orthodox proce1The United States Supreme Court first used the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to upset a state conviction based on an involuntary confession in Brown v. Miss'ssippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). That conviction rested solely upon a confession obtained through
physical violence. In Malinski v. New York, 325 U.S. 401 (1945), the Court held that the admission into evidence of a coerced confession automatically voids a conviction under the due
process clause, no matter how persuasive the remaining evidence of guilt. This rule of "automatic reversal" was coupled with a progressively broadened concept of what constitutes
involuntariness. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (tender age); Watts v. Indiana, 338
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dure require the trial judge to determine specifically that the confession was
voluntary before admitting it as evidence. However, under "New York" procedure, the trial judge need only determine that a "fair question of fact" exists
as to whether the confession was coerced before submitting it to the jury. The
jury is instructed to determine the coercion issue first, and to disregard the
confession if they find it was involuntary, but their finding on coercion is
buried in a general verdict.3 The United States Supreme Court in Stein v. New
York 4 upheld the constitutionality of this procedure holding that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment was not violated if the jury either found
the confession voluntary and utilized it or found it involuntary and disregarded
it.5 The Court refused to presume that the jury would fail to resolve the coercion
issue or that it might utilize the confession after finding it was coerced.6 The
Court further indicated that the allocation of function between judge and jury
is within the discretion of the states and that its review of state prosecutions
would not be influenced by the particular allocation adopted. 7
However, two subsequent Court of Appeals decisions, Cranorv. Gonzaless and
United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond,' seem to hold that the scope of review
by federal district courts in habeas corpus proceedings 10 does depend upon the
U.S. 49 (1949) (relay questioning); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (psychiatric inducement); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (incommunicado detention of prisoner with
subnormal intelligence).
2 The descriptions of the orthodox and "New York" procedures in the text represent brief
general outlines. For more elaborate treatment, see Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The
Allocation of Responsibility Between fudge and -fury,21 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 319-24 (1954);
Maguire, PreliminaryQuestions of Fact in DeterminingAdmissibility of Evidence, 40 HARv. L.
REv. 392, 413-24 (1927); 3 WIGuoRE, EVIDENCE, § 861, and 9 id., §§ 2550-51 (3d ed. 1940).
Wigmore terms the departure from orthodox procedure as "heresy" prompted by a confusion
of admissibility and credibility, the former being the exclusive province of the judge and the
latter of the jury. See also Annot., 170 A.L.R. 567 (1947).
3 In most jurisdictions statutory or constitutional changes would be necessary to permit
verdicts in criminal cases. See generally 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 1399 (1955).
4 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
5
Id. at 193-4.
6Id. at 170. Cf. Meltzer, supranote 3; Gorfinkel, FourteenthAmendment and State Criminal
Proceedings-"OrderedLiberty" or "Just Deserts," 41 CAroF. L. REv. 118 (1953); Note, 52
Mrcir. L. REv. 421 (1954).
7
Id. at 179. See also Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958); Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
8226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), affirming Giron v. Cranor, 116 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Wash. 1953),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935 (1956).
9 271 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 959 (1960).
10Federal Habeas Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1958). The statutory writ is a collateral attack upon the jurisdiction of the convicting court, which jurisdiction is lost if the
Constitution or a federal law is violated. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466-68 (1938). See
Holtzoff, CollateralReview of Convictions in FederalCourts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26 (1945).
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state procedure used. To the extent that federal review of the factual issues n
involved in the coercion question may vary according to the state trial procedure the vitality of the Stein decision seems impaired.
I
In Cranor v. Gonzales,"- the defendant had been convicted of murder in a
Washington state court which had employed the "New York" procedure. After
exhausting his appeal remedies, he applied for a federal writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that his coerced confession had been improperly admitted at trial.
The federal district judge ordered a hearing, and then, after an examination of
the same witnesses who had appeared at the trial, made specific findings on the
facts allegedly constituting coercion." On the basis of these findings he held
that the confession was involuntary and granted the writ of habeas corpus. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court
had discretion to hold a hearing and determine factual issues for itself. 4 The
Court of Appeals also had to meet the argument of the state that even if the
district court could find the confession coerced, it was not permitted to grant
the writ because under the Stein rationale it should be assumed that the jury
had disregarded the confession and convicted on the basis of other evidence.
The Court of Appeals answered, first, that the fact finding capacity of the federal district court on habeas corpus was broader than that of the Supreme Court
on certiorari because the district court could receive evidence and hear witnesses whereas the Supreme Court could not implement the record before it."
Hence, the district court was capable of deciding the factual issues of coercion
rather than merely considering hypothetical alternatives of jury action on this
issue. Second, since the confession was now found to be coerced, it would be
improper to make the defendant prove that the jury had not disregarded his
coerced confession in reaching its verdict. To do so, the court reasoned, would
be to impose an impossible task upon a defendant seeking vindication of his
11If the factual circumstances (in the sense of historical events) surrounding the confession
are undisputed, the federal judiciary, including the United States Supreme Court on certiorari
from a state court, will always exercise independent judgement on the legal inference to be
drawn from those facts. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). This is not to suggest that the
demarcation between questions of law and questions of fact is always clear. See, e.g., Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
1226 F.2d 83.
13Both in the state trial and at the federal habeas corpus hearing, Gonzales repudiated his
confession and testified that he confessed only after being beaten and kicked by the police
and threatened with further violence. The policemen he accused denied his charges in both
courts. The district judge found "that, basically Gonzales' story is a true story." 116 F. Supp.
at 95.
" 226 F.2d at 92.
11 226 F.2d at 91.
16Ibid. See also Note, 8 STAN. L. REv. 451 (1956).
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constitutional rights. The presumption of jury regularity was therefore re7
jected.1
The defendant in United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond'8 had been convicted of murder in a Connecticut state court which had employed the orthodox
procedure to determine that his two confessions, were voluntary and admissable. 9 After exhausting his appeal remedies the defendant sought federal
habeas corpus again claiming that his confessions were involuntary and should
not have been admitted as evidence. The district court ordered a hearing and
without examining the portion of the state record bearing on the voluntariness
of the confessions, independently resolved the pertinent facts contrary to the
trial court.2 0 On the basis of the redetermined facts the district court found that
the first confession was involuntary and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district judge should make
his findings solely upon the basis of the facts as found in the trial record unless he
found a "vital flaw" or unusual circumstances in the record.2 1 Cranor v. Gonsales2 was distinguished as dealing with "New York" procedure where the
record contained no specific finding of facts on the coercion issue.23 The Supreme
Court denied certioriari, stating per curiam,
We read the opinion of the Court of Appeals as holding that while the District Judge
may, unless he finds a vital flaw in the State Court proceedings, accept the determinations in such proceedings, he need not deem such determination binding, and may take
24
testimony.
On-remand, the same district judge construed the two opinions above to mean
that although he had the power to hold a hearing and to take testimony at his
discretion,"6 he was nevertheless bound by the findings of fact made by the
trial judge in the state court if such a hearing developed no evidence different
17226 F.2d at 90. In Stein v. New York, submission of the coercion issue to the jury was characterized as a "practice on the whole assumed to be of advantage to the defense and an additional protection to the accused." 346 U.S. at 189. VIOUOax, EvIDNcE § 861 (2d ed. 1940), notes
that this "heresy" has made rapid strides in recent years. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 2, at 338-39.
18271 F.2d 364.
"1State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 120 A2d 409 (1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 952 (1956). At
trial the state judge merely ruled the confessions were voluntary. Following Rogers' conviction the trial judge made specific findings of the facts on which his ruling was based to permit
an appeal to be perfected.
2" United States ex. rel. Rogers v. Cummings, 154 F. Supp. 636 (D. Conn. 1956). The discrepancy between the findings of the state trial court and the district court was first noted on
remand in United States ex. rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 178 F. Supp. 69, 70 (D. Conn. 1958).
The district judge found that Rogers did make a request to call his counsel. The trial judge had
found otherwise. The only evidence on this point in either court was the testimony of Rogers,
contradicted by the testimony of the police.
21United States ex. rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 252 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1958).
23 252 F. 2d at 810.
24 357 U.S. 220 (1958).
district judge noted that "circumstances" must justify the exercise of this discretion,
but did not indicate what those circumstances were. 178 F. Supp. 69, 72 (D. Conn. 1958).
1"

226 F.2d 83.
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from that presented in the state trial.2 8 He then found that the evidence before
him was essentially similar to that developed before the state trial judge and denied the writ. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial and approved the stand27
ards he had announced.
I
The holdings of Cranor v. Gonzales s and United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond29 on the scope of federal habeas corpus in the coerced confession cases may
be summarized as follows: (1) At the initial stage of the federal court's determination of whether to hold a hearing upon application for writ, both cases affirm
the power of the court to hold a hearing at its discretion even though new evidence might not be prospectively forthcoming 0 (2) At the stage of making
findings of fact pertinent to the voluntariness or involuntariness of the confession, the cases differ according to the procedure followed in the state trial.
Under the Rogers rule, where the trial followed orthodox procedure, the federal
judge is bound by the specific findings of fact made by the state trial judge
unless new evidence is presented at the habeas corpus hearing. Under the
Cranor rule where the trial followed "New York" procedure and there is no
specific finding on the issue of voluntariness in the state record, the federal
judge is free to make independent findings of fact on this issue even though no
new evidence appears at the habeas corpus hearing. (3) At the stage of granting
the writ, both cases permit the writ to be granted if the federal court finds
that the confession was coerced. In the Cranor case, this involved rejection
of the presumption that the jury also found the confession coerced and thereupon disregarded it. Under the Rogers situation, since orthodox procedure involves instructing the jury to utilize the confession, the writ automatically
follows, if the federal judge is able to find the confession coerced within his
imited scope of review.
at 73.
2 In the view of the Court of Appeals, the district judge did not include the finding that
the confessions were voluntary as one of those facts on which he was bound. 271 F.2d at 367.
However, the district court opinion is extremely ambiguous on this point. Compare:"Unless,
on consideration of the full record such grounds are found, this court must accept the findings
of historical fact in reaching its determination on the constitutional issues. This court is bound
by the findings of the state trial court that no request for counsel was made, and that the confessions were voluntary. .. ." 178 F. Supp. at 71, with "[W]hile the District judge may take
additional testimony not considered by the state trial court on constitutional issues, such as
the lack of due process by the use of coerced confessions, and make independent determination
of the facts, such as the voluntary character of confessions, and must independently determine
whether the conviction may constitutionally stand, he may not substitute his judgement on
factual issues fairly tried (i.e. where no vital flaw exists) before the state court, on similar evidence." Id. at 72.
28 226 F.2d 83.
29271 F.2d 364.
21Id.
T

31This discretionary authority to hold a hearing is expressly approved in the per curiam
opinion in Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. 220, and implicit in Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83.
See also Brown v. Allen, 334 U.S. 443, 463-4 (1953). Cf. note 25 supra.
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It may be seen that the essential difference between the two rules is the
extent of the federal judge's ability to make his own findings of fact pertaining
to voluntariness. The basis for this difference is that there is no specific finding
by a state court as to voluntariness under "New York" procedure. Stein v. New
York 3 was criticized for appearing to do away with the doctrine of constitutional fact-under which a criminal defendant is entitled to a specific finding
as to the facts upon which his constitutional rights depend 3 -- in "New York"
procedure cases.33 If Cranor v. Gonzales"4 erects the proper rule governing federal habeas corpus review of "New York" procedure, application of the constitutional fact doctrine seems merely deferred from appellate review by the
Supreme Court to habeas corpus review by the federal district court.
Perhaps more important, however, is the impact which Cranor v. Gonrales35
and United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond" together may have upon state
trial procedures. If federal district courts are bound by state determinations
when the local procedure was orthodox, whereas use of "New York" procedure
permits a far more searching review by the federal court, then federal law appears to discriminate in favor of orthodox procedure. Through their use of
habeas corpus, federal courts may "coerce" state courts into adoption of orthodox procedure in order to avoid federal harassment about coerced confessions.Y
Since Stein v. New York3" upheld the constitutionality of "New York" procedure, it may be anomalous for the states which have followed "New York" procedure to find that their reliance upon the Stein opinion may have been misplaced.
It seems unwise to extend either the Cranoror the Rogers rules to cover all
forms of state procedure merely to achieve uniformity of federal review power.
Application of the Rogers rule of limited review to cases involving "New York"
procedure imposes an unenviable burden upon the defendant who can prove
31346 U.S. 156.
See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, especially the concurring
opinions of Brandeis, J., id. at 73, 77, 84, and of Stone and Cardozo, JJ., id. at 93 (1936); Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1922); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 251. Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts, 66 HAkv. L. REv. 1362, 1376-83
(1953), indicates that the doctrine has faded in civil cases, but a caveat is expressed as to its
force in criminal law. Cf. Holtzoff, supra note 10, at 32.
33Meltzer, supra note 2, at 251.
3 Ibid.
34 226 F.2d 83.

$6 271 F.2d 364.
37Recourse to a third procedure for resolving the coercion issue, the "Massachusetts" or

"humane" rule, wherein the trial judge specifically decides the voluntariness issue as under
orthodox procedure but nevertheless permits the jury to review his findings, might preserve
immunity from federal review of factual questions for states desiring a jury decision on all
questions of fact. However, doubt has been cast on the thoroughness of the judge's findings
under this procedure in view of the jury review. Meltzer, supra note 2, at 329. Federal review
might be guided accordingly. Cf. Newman v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 645, 651-52, 187 S.W.2d
559-63 (1945).
38346 U.S. 156.
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that his confession was coerced, but is necessarily unable to show that the jury
did not disregard the confession in convicting him. Application of the Cranor
doctrine of unlimited review to cases involving the orthodox procedure seems
to unduly extend the circumscribed power of review by federal courts over
state criminal prosecutions. The disharmony between Stein and the habeas
corpus cases can of course be resolved by overruling the Stein opinion. The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to review the last Court of Appeals
decision in United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond.39 It is hoped the Court will
use this case as an opportunity to clear up the many doubts created by the
Stein case as to the vitality of the rule of constitutional fact as well as the scope
of federal habeas corpus review over state criminal procedures.

3g361 U.S. 959 (1960).

